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Smallest repair: briefly explain deciles and the 620 cutoff, and name the 36 percent cap.","excerpt":"the median risk score in the third decile is around 620, which is the traditional cutoff for whether a borrower is subprime or prime"},{"dimension":"date","status":"pass","explanation":"The reading's June 3, 2026 matches the source dateline and the UTC day of originalPublished. The same-day dateModified is not flagged as a later edit. The limitations state the retrieval date. The reading does not use later sidebar items or hindsight framing.","excerpt":"June 3, 2026\nThe Unintended Effects of Interest Rate Caps: Credit Reallocation to Safer Borrowers"},{"dimension":"support","status":"pass","explanation":"Each claim matches the source text: the evidence is consistent with reallocation, the third-through-fifth decile gains offset the second-decile decline, there is a tradeoff, and intent is unclear. The stated limitations about lender motives and generalization are fair. 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