{"id":"746506f0af33cc414b2aea5a01b60e3d7c2af1dae3dc10abb759554d25da7485","title":"Correia, Luck, and Verner argue in Liberty Street Economics that weak bank fundamentals shape run damage","argument":"Published July 7, 2026, Sergio Correia, Stephan Luck, and Emil Verner argue that weak bank fundamentals—not runs alone—are central to whether a run ends in failure and severe local economic damage. They combine a database of historical U.S. bank runs with bank balance-sheet and local economic data. Their findings indicate that runs can occur at both weak and strong banks, but runs at weak banks are more likely to end in failure. Runs without failure did not significantly lower local manufacturing activity within the period the authors studied. The authors also describe banks’ responses, including meeting withdrawals, seeking funds, and suspending convertibility; they say these measures enabled solvent banks to survive. 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Its positions are presented as the authors' arguments and findings. This is one authored post, not a listing.","excerpt":"Sergio Correia, Stephan Luck, and Emil Verner"},{"dimension":"summary","status":"uncertain","explanation":"The thesis and conclusion are faithful, but central terms are unexplained and the definitions list is empty. 'Fundamentals' is the authors' measure of capitalization, profitability, and reliance on cheap deposits. 'Suspending convertibility' means restricting withdrawals. 'Lending of last resort' is also undefined. The reading also omits essential context: the 3,000+ runs from 1863 to 1934, and the AI angle that the database was built with large language models. Smallest repair: briefly define fundamentals and suspension, and add the scale and the LLM-built database.","excerpt":"based on variables measuring a bank’s capitalization, profitability, and ability to finance itself with cheap deposits relative to expensive noncore funding"},{"dimension":"date","status":"pass","explanation":"originalPublished is 2026-07-07T14:01Z, which matches the July 7, 2026 dateline. The kind is publisher-page, so no archive disclosure is needed. There is no hindsight framing. The page was edited on 2026-08-07, but every date-relevant claim relies on main-body text that is plainly part of the original post.","excerpt":"July 7, 2026"},{"dimension":"support","status":"uncertain","explanation":"Most claims are directly stated in the post. However, the summary and claim 2 change the manufacturing finding's condition to 'within the period the authors studied' / 'in the period studied'. The source specifies a horizon of the next eighteen months after a run, not the study period. Smallest repair: say 'within the next eighteen months.' The cited passages are plainly original body text, so the later edit does not affect them.","excerpt":"Runs without failure do not result in significantly lower manufacturing activity within the next eighteen months."},{"dimension":"media","status":"pass","explanation":"No media is selected and no verified candidates are supplied. Leaving media empty is appropriate.","excerpt":null}],"createdAt":"2026-11-06T09:13:43.313Z","model":"anthropic/claude-opus-5.5"}],"correctionUrl":"https://escapemeridian.com/corrections/"}