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This matches the publisher page and its author list. The page is a single publication abstract, not a listing.","excerpt":"Mary Phuong, Roland Zimmermann, Ziyue Wang, Victoria Krakovna, David Lindner"},{"dimension":"summary","status":"uncertain","explanation":"The reading weakens the source's starting premise. The abstract says recent work has already demonstrated frontier models' propensity to scheme. The reading says only that models 'might' pursue misaligned goals, which drops the stake the authors use to motivate the work. Smallest repair: 'The authors cite recent work showing frontier models' situational propensity to scheme'. The rest is clear and faithful. Scheming, situational awareness and stealth are explained in plain language, and 'safety case' is explained in practice by the inability claim that follows it.","excerpt":"Recent work has demonstrated frontier AI models' situational propensity to \"scheme\""},{"dimension":"date","status":"pass","explanation":"evidence.originalPublished is 2026-07-15, which matches the source dateline, and the reading states it at day precision. This is a publisher page, so no archive disclosure is required. The page was edited on 2026-09-25, but the cited abstract text is plainly the original publication content. There is no hindsight framing, and no forecast is presented as an outcome.","excerpt":"July 15, 2026"},{"dimension":"support","status":"pass","explanation":"Each claim is quoted directly from the abstract: the detection and loss-of-control risk, the two prerequisite capabilities, the 'very likely' inability inference, and the Gemini demonstration. 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