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Results, interpretations and limits are framed as the paper's findings rather than established fact.","excerpt":"Authors:Leonidas Raghav"},{"dimension":"summary","status":"pass","explanation":"The summary faithfully states the question, setup, headline result, baseline comparison, bag-of-words caveat, and the false-alarm and short-range limits. Optional fixes: the phrase 'The paper's warning' could be confused with the probe's alarm. The draft omits the source's stated stakes of others acting on the agent's messages or recruitment spreading through a swarm. It also omits that the probe reads the coming disclosure more than the violation. 'linear probe', 'activations', 'zero-shot' and 'bag-of-words classifier' should carry term-library tooltips.","excerpt":"ahead of others acting on its messages or recruitment spreading through a swarm"},{"dimension":"date","status":"pass","explanation":"originalPublished 2026-10-29 matches the arXiv v1 submission date. The feed date of 2026-10-31 is later and correctly not used.","excerpt":"[Submitted on 29 Oct 2026]"},{"dimension":"support","status":"pass","explanation":"The figures are quoted accurately: 82% of leaking calls at a 5% benign flag rate, versus 26% for the zero-shot monitor. The permitted-disclosure, short-range and halting caveats are also accurate. The interpretation claim is labeled and keeps the gap between the controlled setting and deployment. 'Possible first step' slightly softens the source's 'a first step', but it does not misrepresent the source. The question follows from the stated limits.","excerpt":"The probe also flags permitted disclosures: it reads the coming disclosure more than the violation."},{"dimension":"media","status":"pass","explanation":"The selected media is the verified direct link to the arXiv abstract page of this paper, which is the most direct access to the source.","excerpt":null}],"createdAt":"2026-11-11T10:08:04.995Z","model":"anthropic/claude-opus-5.5"}],"correctionUrl":"https://escapemeridian.com/corrections/"}