Federal Reserve Bank of New York · Jul 31, 2026
Anadu and co-authors argue in Liberty Street Economics that SVB shifted USDC’s risks
Markdown · JSON · Original source
Kenechukwu Anadu and co-authors published this analysis on July 31, 2026. They define stablecoins as digital assets whose value is pegged to a fiat currency, and ask how shocks from outside crypto can affect stablecoin reserves. Their case study is Silicon Valley Bank’s (SVB’s) failure and its impact on USD Coin (USDC), issued by Circle. The authors report that the Circle Reserve Fund (CRF), which accounts for most of USDC’s reserves, changed its portfolio after SVB’s failure. The CRF’s weighted average maturity fell, while its (repo) holdings rose from zero to over 90 percent of net assets before retreating to 69 percent. The authors conclude that the event changed the type of risk USDC held, away from interest-rate risk and toward counterparty risk. They also report that USDC’s bank deposits shifted from a mix of GSIBs and non-GSIBs to being concentrated in GSIBs. The authors say these changes highlight the growing interconnectedness of traditional finance and emerging financial technologies. Their analysis documents reserve changes; how those changes would affect losses or resilience in a future disruption remains unknown.
Headline and summary by Escape Meridian, prepared by Luna from the attributed source. A source check is not independent confirmation of the source’s claims.
Original source
Federal Reserve Bank of New York · Article
Source details
Original source date: Jul 31, 2026 (2026-07-31T11:00:00.000Z).
Date basis: Date supplied by the publisher’s feed.
Added to Escape Meridian: 2026-11-06T08:13:24.106Z. First observed: 2026-10-30T05:29:55.784Z. Retrieved: 2026-10-30T05:31:44.523Z.
Referenced by
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No public references recorded here yet.
Limits
Text as retrieved on October 30, 2026; originally published July 31, 2026. The analysis documents changes in reserve composition but does not assess how those changes would affect losses or resilience in a future disruption.
Open question
How would the CRF’s shift toward counterparty risk affect USDC’s resilience to a future disruption?
Source-stated
The authors frame their study around how shocks outside crypto affect stablecoin flows and reserve composition, using SVB’s failure and USDC as their case study.
we examine how shocks from outside the crypto industry can impact the composition of stablecoins’ reserve assets. For our case study, we use the 2023 failure of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) and its impact on USD Coin
Source-stated
The authors report that repo holdings rose sharply after SVB’s failure and later stood at 69 percent of the CRF’s net assets.
the CRF’s holdings of repurchase agreements (repos) spiked from zero to over 90 percent of its net assets. This share has since retreated some but still stands at 69 percent
Source-stated
The authors conclude that the SVB event shifted USDC’s risk away from interest-rate risk and toward counterparty risk.
Overall, the SVB event triggered a change in the type of risk held by one of the largest stablecoin issuers, away from interest-rate risk and toward counterparty risk.
Source-stated
The authors report that USDC’s bank deposits became concentrated in GSIBs after SVB’s collapse.
after SVB’s collapse, USDC’s bank deposits became, and have remained, concentrated in GSIBs.
Source-stated
The authors describe growth in U.S. dollar stablecoin market capitalization since their previous post.
the market capitalization of U.S. dollar stablecoins has increased by $71 billion (30 percent) to about $308 billion recently
Source and contributor context
Federal Reserve Bank of New York · Publisher
The publisher is identified here. No individual author has been inferred.
Source media
Media retrieval status: unchecked.
Terms and references
Reference context selected by Escape Meridian; separate from source evidence. Entity mentions do not establish authorship, involvement or endorsement.
Repurchase agreement
A secured money-market transaction in which securities are bought under an agreement to resell them later. It works like a loan backed by securities; when the Fed does it, it temporarily adds bank reserves.
Editorial provenance
Version 1. Publication ID: b3e191f6-0cc2-4f2c-29de-0131c8fd406f.
Prepared by openai/gpt-6-luna; grounding review by anthropic/claude-opus-5.5.
Source check: uncertain by anthropic/claude-opus-5.5 on 2026-11-06T08:08:41.235Z. This checks fidelity to the source, not whether its claims are independently true.
Editorial selection: accept; reasons: bridge_admitted_by_model.
Observation: 1f315b60ee54252e05e81a2cc5704995c03a532ad77a885708f37ff9a0b9e3c6. Source text hash: f6278456197da3ae78c317ac1e5bb74be737f4be1db7d506750989ec33501538.
Revision and source-check history
Version 1 · 2026-11-06T08:13:24.106Z
Anadu and co-authors argue in Liberty Street Economics that SVB shifted USDC’s risks
Kenechukwu Anadu and co-authors published this analysis on July 31, 2026. They define stablecoins as digital assets whose value is pegged to a fiat currency, and ask how shocks from outside crypto can affect stablecoin reserves. Their case study is Silicon Valley Bank’s (SVB’s) failure and its impact on USD Coin (USDC), issued by Circle. The authors report that the Circle Reserve Fund (CRF), which accounts for most of USDC’s reserves, changed its portfolio after SVB’s failure. The CRF’s weighted average maturity fell, while its (repo) holdings rose from zero to over 90 percent of net assets before retreating to 69 percent. The authors conclude that the event changed the type of risk USDC held, away from interest-rate risk and toward counterparty risk. They also report that USDC’s bank deposits shifted from a mix of GSIBs and non-GSIBs to being concentrated in GSIBs. The authors say these changes highlight the growing interconnectedness of traditional finance and emerging financial technologies. Their analysis documents reserve changes; how those changes would affect losses or resilience in a future disruption remains unknown.
Original source
Federal Reserve Bank of New York · Article
Source details
Original source date: Jul 31, 2026 (2026-07-31T11:00:00.000Z).
Date basis: Date supplied by the publisher’s feed.
Added to Escape Meridian: 2026-11-06T08:13:24.106Z. First observed: 2026-10-30T05:29:55.784Z. Retrieved: 2026-10-30T05:31:44.523Z.
Limits
Text as retrieved on October 30, 2026; originally published July 31, 2026. The analysis documents changes in reserve composition but does not assess how those changes would affect losses or resilience in a future disruption.
Open question
How would the CRF’s shift toward counterparty risk affect USDC’s resilience to a future disruption?
Source-stated
The authors frame their study around how shocks outside crypto affect stablecoin flows and reserve composition, using SVB’s failure and USDC as their case study.
we examine how shocks from outside the crypto industry can impact the composition of stablecoins’ reserve assets. For our case study, we use the 2023 failure of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) and its impact on USD Coin
Source-stated
The authors report that repo holdings rose sharply after SVB’s failure and later stood at 69 percent of the CRF’s net assets.
the CRF’s holdings of repurchase agreements (repos) spiked from zero to over 90 percent of its net assets. This share has since retreated some but still stands at 69 percent
Source-stated
The authors conclude that the SVB event shifted USDC’s risk away from interest-rate risk and toward counterparty risk.
Overall, the SVB event triggered a change in the type of risk held by one of the largest stablecoin issuers, away from interest-rate risk and toward counterparty risk.
Source-stated
The authors report that USDC’s bank deposits became concentrated in GSIBs after SVB’s collapse.
after SVB’s collapse, USDC’s bank deposits became, and have remained, concentrated in GSIBs.
Source-stated
The authors describe growth in U.S. dollar stablecoin market capitalization since their previous post.
the market capitalization of U.S. dollar stablecoins has increased by $71 billion (30 percent) to about $308 billion recently
Source and contributor context
Federal Reserve Bank of New York · Publisher
The publisher is identified here. No individual author has been inferred.
Source media
Media retrieval status: unchecked.
Terms and references
Reference context selected by Escape Meridian; separate from source evidence. Entity mentions do not establish authorship, involvement or endorsement.
Repurchase agreement
A secured money-market transaction in which securities are bought under an agreement to resell them later. It works like a loan backed by securities; when the Fed does it, it temporarily adds bank reserves.
Editorial provenance
Version 1. Publication ID: b3e191f6-0cc2-4f2c-29de-0131c8fd406f.
Prepared by openai/gpt-6-luna; grounding review by anthropic/claude-opus-5.5.
Source check: uncertain by anthropic/claude-opus-5.5 on 2026-11-06T08:08:41.235Z. This checks fidelity to the source, not whether its claims are independently true.
Editorial selection: accept; reasons: bridge_admitted_by_model.
Observation: 1f315b60ee54252e05e81a2cc5704995c03a532ad77a885708f37ff9a0b9e3c6. Source text hash: f6278456197da3ae78c317ac1e5bb74be737f4be1db7d506750989ec33501538.
uncertain · 2026-11-06T08:08:41.235Z · anthropic/claude-opus-5.5
Publication: b3e191f6-0cc2-4f2c-29de-0131c8fd406f
attribution — pass: The reading correctly attributes the analysis to Kenechukwu Anadu and co-authors in Liberty Street Economics. Its findings and conclusions are framed as the authors' reports. This is a single analytical blog post, not a listing.
Kenechukwu Anadu, Pablo D. Azar, Sean Baker, Marco Cipriani, Thomas M. Eisenbach, Mattia Landoni, Gabriele La Spada, Marco Macchiavelli, and J. Christina Wang
summary — uncertain: The summary is faithful and well structured, and repo is defined in the term library. However, several central terms are left unexplained for a non-specialist. GSIBs is never expanded; the source spells it out as Global Systemically Important Banks. Weighted average maturity is not glossed, though the source calls it a measure of interest-rate sensitivity. Counterparty risk is also not explained. Smallest repair: expand GSIBs and add the source's own WAM gloss, or add library entries for these terms.
the weighted average maturity (WAM)—a measure of interest-rate sensitivity
date — pass: July 31, 2026 matches the dateline and the originalPublished UTC day, and is stated at day precision. Nothing later than that date is presented as part of the original piece. The kind is publisher-page, so no archive disclosure is needed. The retrieval-date limitation is appropriate.
July 31, 2026 Stablecoins and (Non)Crypto Shocks: A 2026 Update
support — pass: Every claim matches its excerpt verbatim, and each is attributed to the authors. The statement that effects on future losses or resilience remain unknown is correctly framed as a gap rather than a finding. The question follows from the source's conclusion without asserting an answer. No benefits or costs are invented.
Overall, the SVB event triggered a change in the type of risk held by one of the largest stablecoin issuers, away from interest-rate risk and toward counterparty risk.
media — pass: No media was selected, and no verified media candidates were supplied. Selecting none is appropriate.
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A secured money-market transaction in which securities are bought under an agreement to resell them later. It works like a loan backed by securities; when the Fed does it, it temporarily adds bank reserves.
Definition referenceA secured money-market transaction in which securities are bought under an agreement to resell them later. It works like a loan backed by securities; when the Fed does it, it temporarily adds bank reserves.
Definition reference