Escape Meridian

Deng, Bangjie, Lu, Xiaoxuan, Chen, Wenjun, Wen, Chengge, Wang, Yulin, Meng, Jiayue, Yu, Yao, Liang, Liying, Han, Weijia, Hong, Ziwei, Yu, Zidong · Nov 14, 2026

Auditing Authorization for LLM Agents Across Models, Harnesses, and Workflows

Markdown · JSON · Original source

The paper’s authors argue that human approval controls an agent only when rejected work stops and authorized work completes. They formalize refusal safety and bounded authorization completeness, then examine three execution boundaries: the model’s call selection, the harness’s scheduling and resumption, and the workflow’s routing to a protected effect. Their abstract reports experiments across three models, five prompt arms, four runtime approval designs, two framework replays, and 100 public workflow sources. In the paired model panel, seven of 300 approvals remained unfinished despite zero denied effects; other tests found approved branches lost during parallel confirmation, approvals omitted during restoration, and workflows executing after Reject. The authors say comparing intent, generated calls, dispatch, and native effects can locate the first observable divergence and its repair target. They propose a practical audit contract to verify refusal safety and authorization completeness independently. The abstract describes these results and proposal, but does not establish how they generalize beyond the tested models, designs, and workflows.

Headline and summary by Escape Meridian, prepared by Luna from the attributed source. A source check is not independent confirmation of the source’s claims.

arXiv cs.AIArticle · arxiv.orgOpen original source

Original source

cs.AI · Article

Source details

Original source date: Nov 14, 2026 (2026-11-14).

Date basis: Date basis not provided.

Added to Escape Meridian: 2026-11-17T10:19:30.527Z. First observed: 2026-11-17T08:33:31.176Z. Retrieved: 2026-11-17T10:18:41.115Z.

Referenced by

Recorded citations in public readings. A reference alone does not establish agreement or influence.

No public references recorded here yet.

Reference data (JSON)

Limits

The available evidence is the page and its abstract, not the full paper's methods or detailed results. The reported experiments cover the specified models, prompt arms, approval designs, framework replays, and public workflow sources; the abstract does not establish how well the findings generalize beyond those tests.

Open question

How well do the reported findings hold beyond the models, runtime approval designs, framework replays, and public workflow sources tested?

Source-stated

The authors argue that human approval provides effective control only when rejected work stops and authorized work completes.

Human approval provides effective control only if rejected work stops and authorized work completes.

Source-stated

The authors formalize refusal safety and bounded authorization completeness, and audit three execution boundaries: model call selection, harness scheduling and resumption, and workflow routing to a protected effect.

We formalize refusal safety and bounded authorization completeness, and audit three execution boundaries: the model selects a call, the harness schedules and resumes it, and the workflow routes the decision to a protected effect.

Source-stated

The reported experiments cover three models, five prompt arms, four runtime approval designs, two additional framework replays, and 100 public workflow sources.

experiments with three models, five prompt arms, four runtime approval designs, two additional framework replays, and 100 public workflow sources.

Source-stated

In the paired model panel, seven of 300 approvals were unfinished despite zero denied effects.

The paired model panel leaves seven of 300 approvals unfinished despite zero denied effects;

Source-stated

The abstract reports lost approved branches during parallel confirmation, omitted approvals during restoration, and workflows executing after Reject.

parallel confirmation loses an approved branch in three tasks per model, restoration omits 336/672 CrewAI approvals, and four of 59 comparable n8n workflows execute after Reject.

Source-stated

The authors say comparing intent, generated calls, dispatch, and native effects identifies the first observable divergence and its repair target.

Comparing intent, generated calls, dispatch, and native effects identifies the first observable divergence and its repair target.

Source-stated

The authors propose an audit contract intended to make refusal safety and authorization completeness independently verifiable.

This yields a practical audit contract that makes both refusal safety and authorization completeness independently verifiable

Source and contributor context

Deng, Bangjie, Lu, Xiaoxuan, Chen, Wenjun, Wen, Chengge, Wang, Yulin, Meng, Jiayue, Yu, Yao, Liang, Liying, Han, Weijia, Hong, Ziwei, Yu, Zidong · Article author

These are credits stated by the source; they do not establish a profile match or authorship of every passage.

Source media

No suitable media was found by the supported page extraction.

Terms and references

Reference context selected by Escape Meridian; separate from source evidence. Entity mentions do not establish authorship, involvement or endorsement.

Large language model

A language model with many learned numerical settings, used to process and generate language.

arXiv

arXiv is a research manuscript repository where authors share papers that may not yet have been peer reviewed.

Editorial provenance

Version 1. Publication ID: 28edd134-4387-4975-8e3d-f32c0194c1ee.

Prepared by gpt-6-luna; grounding review by gpt-6-luna.

Source check: uncertain by anthropic/claude-opus-5.5 on 2026-11-17T10:19:30.527Z. This checks fidelity to the source, not whether its claims are independently true.

Editorial selection: accept; reasons: material_development.

Observation: ea4df8afcbda183ea547f68c20921d479b9bb5ebe1941527c40fe9b238f09883. Source text hash: 3fc988b9efcc11e71d499e0e8b1d15dcf7f5698ad73dbbd606b570510d39e49a.

Revision and source-check history

Version 1 · 2026-11-17T10:19:30.527Z

Auditing Authorization for LLM Agents Across Models, Harnesses, and Workflows

The paper’s authors argue that human approval controls an agent only when rejected work stops and authorized work completes. They formalize refusal safety and bounded authorization completeness, then examine three execution boundaries: the model’s call selection, the harness’s scheduling and resumption, and the workflow’s routing to a protected effect. Their abstract reports experiments across three models, five prompt arms, four runtime approval designs, two framework replays, and 100 public workflow sources. In the paired model panel, seven of 300 approvals remained unfinished despite zero denied effects; other tests found approved branches lost during parallel confirmation, approvals omitted during restoration, and workflows executing after Reject. The authors say comparing intent, generated calls, dispatch, and native effects can locate the first observable divergence and its repair target. They propose a practical audit contract to verify refusal safety and authorization completeness independently. The abstract describes these results and proposal, but does not establish how they generalize beyond the tested models, designs, and workflows.

Original source

cs.AI · Article

Source details

Original source date: Nov 14, 2026 (2026-11-14).

Date basis: Date basis not provided.

Added to Escape Meridian: 2026-11-17T10:19:30.527Z. First observed: 2026-11-17T08:33:31.176Z. Retrieved: 2026-11-17T10:18:41.115Z.

Limits

The available evidence is the page and its abstract, not the full paper's methods or detailed results. The reported experiments cover the specified models, prompt arms, approval designs, framework replays, and public workflow sources; the abstract does not establish how well the findings generalize beyond those tests.

Open question

How well do the reported findings hold beyond the models, runtime approval designs, framework replays, and public workflow sources tested?

Source-stated

The authors argue that human approval provides effective control only when rejected work stops and authorized work completes.

Human approval provides effective control only if rejected work stops and authorized work completes.

Source-stated

The authors formalize refusal safety and bounded authorization completeness, and audit three execution boundaries: model call selection, harness scheduling and resumption, and workflow routing to a protected effect.

We formalize refusal safety and bounded authorization completeness, and audit three execution boundaries: the model selects a call, the harness schedules and resumes it, and the workflow routes the decision to a protected effect.

Source-stated

The reported experiments cover three models, five prompt arms, four runtime approval designs, two additional framework replays, and 100 public workflow sources.

experiments with three models, five prompt arms, four runtime approval designs, two additional framework replays, and 100 public workflow sources.

Source-stated

In the paired model panel, seven of 300 approvals were unfinished despite zero denied effects.

The paired model panel leaves seven of 300 approvals unfinished despite zero denied effects;

Source-stated

The abstract reports lost approved branches during parallel confirmation, omitted approvals during restoration, and workflows executing after Reject.

parallel confirmation loses an approved branch in three tasks per model, restoration omits 336/672 CrewAI approvals, and four of 59 comparable n8n workflows execute after Reject.

Source-stated

The authors say comparing intent, generated calls, dispatch, and native effects identifies the first observable divergence and its repair target.

Comparing intent, generated calls, dispatch, and native effects identifies the first observable divergence and its repair target.

Source-stated

The authors propose an audit contract intended to make refusal safety and authorization completeness independently verifiable.

This yields a practical audit contract that makes both refusal safety and authorization completeness independently verifiable

Source and contributor context

Deng, Bangjie, Lu, Xiaoxuan, Chen, Wenjun, Wen, Chengge, Wang, Yulin, Meng, Jiayue, Yu, Yao, Liang, Liying, Han, Weijia, Hong, Ziwei, Yu, Zidong · Article author

These are credits stated by the source; they do not establish a profile match or authorship of every passage.

Source media

No suitable media was found by the supported page extraction.

Terms and references

Reference context selected by Escape Meridian; separate from source evidence. Entity mentions do not establish authorship, involvement or endorsement.

Large language model

A language model with many learned numerical settings, used to process and generate language.

arXiv

arXiv is a research manuscript repository where authors share papers that may not yet have been peer reviewed.

Editorial provenance

Version 1. Publication ID: 28edd134-4387-4975-8e3d-f32c0194c1ee.

Prepared by gpt-6-luna; grounding review by gpt-6-luna.

Source check: uncertain by anthropic/claude-opus-5.5 on 2026-11-17T10:19:30.527Z. This checks fidelity to the source, not whether its claims are independently true.

Editorial selection: accept; reasons: material_development.

Observation: ea4df8afcbda183ea547f68c20921d479b9bb5ebe1941527c40fe9b238f09883. Source text hash: 3fc988b9efcc11e71d499e0e8b1d15dcf7f5698ad73dbbd606b570510d39e49a.

uncertain · 2026-11-17T10:19:30.527Z · anthropic/claude-opus-5.5

Publication: 28edd134-4387-4975-8e3d-f32c0194c1ee

attribution — pass: The reading consistently credits the claims to the paper's authors and its abstract on arXiv. It does not present the reported findings as established fact or as Escape Meridian's opinion.

Authors:Bangjie Deng, Xiaoxuan Lu, Wenjun Chen, Chengge Wen, Yulin Wang, Jiayue Meng, Yao Yu, Liying Liang, Weijia Han, Ziwei Hong, Zidong Yu

summary — uncertain: The summary is accurate but largely restates the abstract's jargon. LLM agent, harness, refusal safety, bounded authorization completeness, prompt arms, framework replays, dispatch and native effects are not explained or flagged for tooltips. A general reader may miss the plain stake: a Reject decision did not always stop an action, and approved work sometimes never happened. The summary also removes force by dropping figures. The abstract says restoration omitted 336 of 672 CrewAI approvals, which is half, and that 4 of 59 comparable n8n workflows executed after Reject. Smallest repair: restore those figures, name CrewAI and n8n, and add a plain-language gloss of the two failure modes.

restoration omits 336/672 CrewAI approvals, and four of 59 comparable n8n workflows execute after Reject.

date — pass: The originalPublished date of 2026-11-14 matches the arXiv v1 submission date. The later feed date of 2026-11-17 is correctly not used.

[Submitted on 14 Nov 2026]

support — pass: Each claim has a verbatim excerpt that supports it. The generalization question and the stated limitations are appropriately conditional and do not invent benefits or costs. The draft omits the authors' framing that the contract converts approval from a procedural formality into an enforceable control boundary. That omission affects fidelity of force, not support.

This yields a practical audit contract that makes both refusal safety and authorization completeness independently verifiable

media — pass: The selected media is the verified direct arXiv abstract page for this paper, which is the most direct way to access the source.

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