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Federal Reserve Bank of New York · Sep 2, 2026

Goldberg, Hannaoui and Parthasarathy argue in Liberty Street Economics that the dollar’s reserve decline is concentrated

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The Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Liberty Street Economics published this analysis on September 2, 2026. Linda S. Goldberg, Oliver Hannaoui, and Sneha Parthasarathy argue that the falling dollar share of global official foreign exchange reserves does not show a widespread move away from dollar assets. Their distinction is between the “preferences channel”—countries reallocating existing reserves among currencies—and the “reserve change channel,” in which countries’ reserve portfolios grow or shrink. They find roughly equal numbers of countries increased and decreased their dollar shares, while a small number of large reserve holders account for much of the aggregate decline. For 2019 to 2023, the sixty-two countries with complete data collectively increased their dollar allocations through the preferences channel; the authors infer that China, Russia, Mexico, and Morocco, whose 2023 allocations are missing, account for most of the decline under assumptions matching the observed aggregate movement. The authors conclude there is little evidence of widespread official diversification away from dollars. They say reserve holdings remain driven by countries’ needs for dollar liquidity, currency management, and insurance against funding shocks, and that understanding concentration matters for policymakers and market participants interpreting the dollar’s international role. The 2

Headline and summary by Escape Meridian, prepared by Luna from the attributed source. A source check is not independent confirmation of the source’s claims.

Federal Reserve Bank of New YorkArticle · libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.orgOpen original source

Original source

Federal Reserve Bank of New York · Article

Source details

Original source date: Sep 2, 2026 (2026-09-02T14:00:00.000Z).

Date basis: Date supplied by the publisher’s feed.

Added to Escape Meridian: 2026-11-06T05:03:29.038Z. First observed: 2026-10-30T13:02:31.804Z. Retrieved: 2026-10-30T13:03:47.127Z.

Referenced by

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Limits

Text as retrieved on October 30, 2026; originally published September 2, 2026. The authors lack complete 2023 dollar-share data for China, Russia, Mexico, and Morocco; their collective contribution is characterized under assumptions consistent with the observed aggregate decline. The authors’ analysis concerns official foreign exchange reserves and does not by itself establish changes in other uses of the dollar in international financial markets.

Open question

How would the authors’ account change if the missing 2023 dollar-allocation data for China, Russia, Mexico, and Morocco became available?

Source-stated

The authors argue that the decline in the dollar’s share of reserves is not evidence of a systematic global shift away from dollar assets.

the aggregate decline is not a systematic global shift away from dollar assets.

Source-stated

The authors distinguish active reallocations of existing portfolios from changes in reserve holdings that affect the global aggregate.

Countries can actively reallocate their existing portfolios away from dollar assets and toward other currencies, which we term the “preferences channel.”

Source-stated

For 2019 to 2023, the authors report that the countries with complete data collectively increased their dollar allocations through the preferences channel; the estimated contribution of four countries with missing data depends on assumptions.

For the sixty-two countries for which we have complete data, the preferences channel is actually slightly positive at 0.3 percentage point, meaning these countries collectively increased their dollar allocations over the period.

Source-stated

The authors conclude that there is little evidence of widespread official diversification away from dollars.

our analysis indicates that there is little evidence of a widespread official diversification away from dollars, despite the decline in the dollar share of aggregate official reserves.

Source-stated

The post is dated September 2, 2026.

September 2, 2026 Are Central Banks Moving Out of Dollar Assets?

Source and contributor context

Federal Reserve Bank of New York · Publisher

The publisher is identified here. No individual author has been inferred.

Source media

Media retrieval status: unchecked.

Terms and references

Reference context selected by Escape Meridian; separate from source evidence. Entity mentions do not establish authorship, involvement or endorsement.

Editorial provenance

Version 1. Publication ID: 7a9be209-c8cd-5af4-0d34-10024de949b5.

Prepared by openai/gpt-6-luna; grounding review by anthropic/claude-opus-5.5.

Source check: uncertain by anthropic/claude-opus-5.5 on 2026-11-06T04:58:41.512Z. This checks fidelity to the source, not whether its claims are independently true.

Editorial selection: accept; reasons: bridge_admitted_by_model.

Observation: 50020ee008a5ca5575ced2efd09e9008227e15930a09fee9738fc7fc0e8a6edc. Source text hash: 58d7e6b6c72f49fd0f73331e6ff484c5d0399e3e2dca0d3f702458a101dd8633.

Revision and source-check history

Version 1 · 2026-11-06T05:03:29.038Z

Goldberg, Hannaoui and Parthasarathy argue in Liberty Street Economics that the dollar’s reserve decline is concentrated

The Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Liberty Street Economics published this analysis on September 2, 2026. Linda S. Goldberg, Oliver Hannaoui, and Sneha Parthasarathy argue that the falling dollar share of global official foreign exchange reserves does not show a widespread move away from dollar assets. Their distinction is between the “preferences channel”—countries reallocating existing reserves among currencies—and the “reserve change channel,” in which countries’ reserve portfolios grow or shrink. They find roughly equal numbers of countries increased and decreased their dollar shares, while a small number of large reserve holders account for much of the aggregate decline. For 2019 to 2023, the sixty-two countries with complete data collectively increased their dollar allocations through the preferences channel; the authors infer that China, Russia, Mexico, and Morocco, whose 2023 allocations are missing, account for most of the decline under assumptions matching the observed aggregate movement. The authors conclude there is little evidence of widespread official diversification away from dollars. They say reserve holdings remain driven by countries’ needs for dollar liquidity, currency management, and insurance against funding shocks, and that understanding concentration matters for policymakers and market participants interpreting the dollar’s international role. The 2

Original source

Federal Reserve Bank of New York · Article

Source details

Original source date: Sep 2, 2026 (2026-09-02T14:00:00.000Z).

Date basis: Date supplied by the publisher’s feed.

Added to Escape Meridian: 2026-11-06T05:03:29.038Z. First observed: 2026-10-30T13:02:31.804Z. Retrieved: 2026-10-30T13:03:47.127Z.

Limits

Text as retrieved on October 30, 2026; originally published September 2, 2026. The authors lack complete 2023 dollar-share data for China, Russia, Mexico, and Morocco; their collective contribution is characterized under assumptions consistent with the observed aggregate decline. The authors’ analysis concerns official foreign exchange reserves and does not by itself establish changes in other uses of the dollar in international financial markets.

Open question

How would the authors’ account change if the missing 2023 dollar-allocation data for China, Russia, Mexico, and Morocco became available?

Source-stated

The authors argue that the decline in the dollar’s share of reserves is not evidence of a systematic global shift away from dollar assets.

the aggregate decline is not a systematic global shift away from dollar assets.

Source-stated

The authors distinguish active reallocations of existing portfolios from changes in reserve holdings that affect the global aggregate.

Countries can actively reallocate their existing portfolios away from dollar assets and toward other currencies, which we term the “preferences channel.”

Source-stated

For 2019 to 2023, the authors report that the countries with complete data collectively increased their dollar allocations through the preferences channel; the estimated contribution of four countries with missing data depends on assumptions.

For the sixty-two countries for which we have complete data, the preferences channel is actually slightly positive at 0.3 percentage point, meaning these countries collectively increased their dollar allocations over the period.

Source-stated

The authors conclude that there is little evidence of widespread official diversification away from dollars.

our analysis indicates that there is little evidence of a widespread official diversification away from dollars, despite the decline in the dollar share of aggregate official reserves.

Source-stated

The post is dated September 2, 2026.

September 2, 2026 Are Central Banks Moving Out of Dollar Assets?

Source and contributor context

Federal Reserve Bank of New York · Publisher

The publisher is identified here. No individual author has been inferred.

Source media

Media retrieval status: unchecked.

Terms and references

Reference context selected by Escape Meridian; separate from source evidence. Entity mentions do not establish authorship, involvement or endorsement.

Editorial provenance

Version 1. Publication ID: 7a9be209-c8cd-5af4-0d34-10024de949b5.

Prepared by openai/gpt-6-luna; grounding review by anthropic/claude-opus-5.5.

Source check: uncertain by anthropic/claude-opus-5.5 on 2026-11-06T04:58:41.512Z. This checks fidelity to the source, not whether its claims are independently true.

Editorial selection: accept; reasons: bridge_admitted_by_model.

Observation: 50020ee008a5ca5575ced2efd09e9008227e15930a09fee9738fc7fc0e8a6edc. Source text hash: 58d7e6b6c72f49fd0f73331e6ff484c5d0399e3e2dca0d3f702458a101dd8633.

uncertain · 2026-11-06T04:58:41.512Z · anthropic/claude-opus-5.5

Publication: 7a9be209-c8cd-5af4-0d34-10024de949b5

attribution — pass: The reading correctly attributes the analysis to Linda S. Goldberg, Oliver Hannaoui, and Sneha Parthasarathy in the New York Fed's Liberty Street Economics. Their conclusions are kept as the authors' claims. The page is a single analytical post, not a listing.

Linda S. Goldberg, Oliver Hannaoui, and Sneha Parthasarathy

summary — uncertain: The summary ends mid-sentence with the fragment "The 2", which leaves visible broken text; the smallest repair is to delete or complete it. The term "official foreign exchange reserves" is central, but it is never explained in plain language, and no definitions are supplied. A non-specialist may not know these are currency assets held by central banks. The reserve change channel is also described only as portfolios growing or shrinking. It omits the key mechanism: reserves change at dollar shares different from the global average, which mechanically shifts the aggregate. Otherwise the summary is faithful, and the question is fair.

countries can accumulate or decumulate new foreign exchange reserves at dollar shares different from the global average, which we call the “reserve change channel.”

date — pass: The evidence date, 2026-09-02T14:00Z, matches the dateline and the reading's September 2, 2026. The retrieval date is disclosed. The source is a publisher page, so no archive disclosure is needed. Adjacent-post navigation and related-story links are not used. There is no hindsight framing.

September 2, 2026 Are Central Banks Moving Out of Dollar Assets?

support — pass: Each claim matches its excerpt. The reading frames the inferred contribution of the four countries as resting on the authors' assumptions. The limitations accurately note the data gap and the scope limited to official reserves. No unsupported benefits, costs, or forecasts are added.

This suggests that the aggregate dollar share decline over 2019 to 2023 is almost entirely attributable to the preferences of these four countries.

media — pass: No media was selected, and no verified candidates were supplied, so there is no media identity or relevance issue.

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