Allmendinger, Simeon, Bogucka, Edyta Paulina, Kühl, Niklas, Quercia, Daniele · Nov 19, 2026
Whose Risks Count? What 1,901 AI Incidents Show About Corporate Disclosures
Markdown · JSON · Original source
Authors Simeon Allmendinger, Edyta Paulina Bogucka, Niklas Kühl and Daniele Quercia examine whether harms from AI systems appear in companies’ securities filings. In US securities regulation, companies registered with the SEC must disclose material risks; the authors explain that materiality is defined by what a reasonable investor would consider important. That means harms to other people enter disclosures only insofar as they become financial risks for the company. The authors match AI incidents to filings by risk type. Among incidents with filings both before and after them, they report that half involved a risk type the AI actor never disclosed. They find a sharp difference by harm type: filings disclosed risk types for 67% of system failures but only 2% of social system harms, while AI actors themselves reported fewer than 2% of incidents. The authors argue that securities disclosure records risks AI actors face, rather than the harms borne by people subject to AI. They suggest that public authorities holding AI actors accountable for those harms could make them financially material. The authors release DISC, a corpus of disclosures and incidents, to support this work.
Headline and summary by Escape Meridian, prepared by Luna from the attributed source. A source check is not independent confirmation of the source’s claims.
Original source
cs.AI · Article
Source details
Original source date: Nov 19, 2026 (2026-11-19).
Date basis: Date basis not provided.
Added to Escape Meridian: 2026-11-20T05:46:53.671Z. First observed: 2026-11-20T05:08:03.411Z. Retrieved: 2026-11-20T05:46:03.905Z.
Referenced by
Recorded citations in public readings. A reference alone does not establish agreement or influence.
No public references recorded here yet.
Limits
The supplied evidence is the paper’s abstract; it does not provide details of the matching method or further analysis of the reported differences. The abstract presents the authors’ findings and proposal; the supplied evidence does not establish whether public accountability would make harms financially material.
Open question
Would public authorities holding AI actors accountable for harms to people subject to AI make those harms financially material, as the authors suggest?
Source-stated
The authors say securities disclosure depends on materiality as judged by a reasonable investor, so harms to third parties enter filings only when they become financial risks for the company.
harms to third parties enter disclosure only insofar as they become financial risks for the company.
Source-stated
The authors matched AI incidents with SEC filings by risk type; among incidents with filings both before and after, half involved a risk type the AI actor never disclosed.
Of the 1,901 incidents with filings before and after them, half belong to a risk type that the AI actor never disclosed
Source-stated
The authors report that filings disclosed risk types for system failures far more often than for social system harms.
Filings disclose the risk types of 67\% of system failures but only 2\% of social system harms
Source-stated
The authors conclude that securities disclosure reflects risks faced by AI actors rather than harms borne by people subject to AI, and suggest public accountability could make those harms financially material.
Public authorities that hold AI actors accountable for such harms could make them financially material.
Source-stated
The authors report that AI actors themselves report fewer than 2% of incidents.
AI actors themselves report fewer than 2\% of incidents.
Source and contributor context
Allmendinger, Simeon, Bogucka, Edyta Paulina, Kühl, Niklas, Quercia, Daniele · Article author
These are credits stated by the source; they do not establish a profile match or authorship of every passage.
Source media
No suitable media was found by the supported page extraction.
Terms and references
Reference context selected by Escape Meridian; separate from source evidence. Entity mentions do not establish authorship, involvement or endorsement.
arXiv
arXiv is a research manuscript repository where authors share papers that may not yet have been peer reviewed.
Editorial provenance
Version 1. Publication ID: 74d90606-4891-4f85-8690-822f6fd0c9aa.
Prepared by gpt-6-luna; grounding review by gpt-6-luna.
Source check: passed by anthropic/claude-opus-5.5 on 2026-11-20T05:46:53.671Z. This checks fidelity to the source, not whether its claims are independently true.
Editorial selection: accept; reasons: useful_perspective.
Observation: 8d98b5f7152de57249385915fb0d853c18b1e67629a1ff7effec231dd90d98a1. Source text hash: f067d4a0c03ea1bc05b601027712fa00a5e76d4385fa813e19dbc45a7b105e3b.
Revision and source-check history
Version 1 · 2026-11-20T05:46:53.671Z
Whose Risks Count? What 1,901 AI Incidents Show About Corporate Disclosures
Authors Simeon Allmendinger, Edyta Paulina Bogucka, Niklas Kühl and Daniele Quercia examine whether harms from AI systems appear in companies’ securities filings. In US securities regulation, companies registered with the SEC must disclose material risks; the authors explain that materiality is defined by what a reasonable investor would consider important. That means harms to other people enter disclosures only insofar as they become financial risks for the company. The authors match AI incidents to filings by risk type. Among incidents with filings both before and after them, they report that half involved a risk type the AI actor never disclosed. They find a sharp difference by harm type: filings disclosed risk types for 67% of system failures but only 2% of social system harms, while AI actors themselves reported fewer than 2% of incidents. The authors argue that securities disclosure records risks AI actors face, rather than the harms borne by people subject to AI. They suggest that public authorities holding AI actors accountable for those harms could make them financially material. The authors release DISC, a corpus of disclosures and incidents, to support this work.
Original source
cs.AI · Article
Source details
Original source date: Nov 19, 2026 (2026-11-19).
Date basis: Date basis not provided.
Added to Escape Meridian: 2026-11-20T05:46:53.671Z. First observed: 2026-11-20T05:08:03.411Z. Retrieved: 2026-11-20T05:46:03.905Z.
Limits
The supplied evidence is the paper’s abstract; it does not provide details of the matching method or further analysis of the reported differences. The abstract presents the authors’ findings and proposal; the supplied evidence does not establish whether public accountability would make harms financially material.
Open question
Would public authorities holding AI actors accountable for harms to people subject to AI make those harms financially material, as the authors suggest?
Source-stated
The authors say securities disclosure depends on materiality as judged by a reasonable investor, so harms to third parties enter filings only when they become financial risks for the company.
harms to third parties enter disclosure only insofar as they become financial risks for the company.
Source-stated
The authors matched AI incidents with SEC filings by risk type; among incidents with filings both before and after, half involved a risk type the AI actor never disclosed.
Of the 1,901 incidents with filings before and after them, half belong to a risk type that the AI actor never disclosed
Source-stated
The authors report that filings disclosed risk types for system failures far more often than for social system harms.
Filings disclose the risk types of 67\% of system failures but only 2\% of social system harms
Source-stated
The authors conclude that securities disclosure reflects risks faced by AI actors rather than harms borne by people subject to AI, and suggest public accountability could make those harms financially material.
Public authorities that hold AI actors accountable for such harms could make them financially material.
Source-stated
The authors report that AI actors themselves report fewer than 2% of incidents.
AI actors themselves report fewer than 2\% of incidents.
Source and contributor context
Allmendinger, Simeon, Bogucka, Edyta Paulina, Kühl, Niklas, Quercia, Daniele · Article author
These are credits stated by the source; they do not establish a profile match or authorship of every passage.
Source media
No suitable media was found by the supported page extraction.
Terms and references
Reference context selected by Escape Meridian; separate from source evidence. Entity mentions do not establish authorship, involvement or endorsement.
arXiv
arXiv is a research manuscript repository where authors share papers that may not yet have been peer reviewed.
Editorial provenance
Version 1. Publication ID: 74d90606-4891-4f85-8690-822f6fd0c9aa.
Prepared by gpt-6-luna; grounding review by gpt-6-luna.
Source check: passed by anthropic/claude-opus-5.5 on 2026-11-20T05:46:53.671Z. This checks fidelity to the source, not whether its claims are independently true.
Editorial selection: accept; reasons: useful_perspective.
Observation: 8d98b5f7152de57249385915fb0d853c18b1e67629a1ff7effec231dd90d98a1. Source text hash: f067d4a0c03ea1bc05b601027712fa00a5e76d4385fa813e19dbc45a7b105e3b.
passed · 2026-11-20T05:46:53.671Z · anthropic/claude-opus-5.5
Publication: 74d90606-4891-4f85-8690-822f6fd0c9aa
attribution — pass: The draft correctly names the four authors listed on the arXiv page. It frames the findings, conclusion and proposal as the authors' reports and arguments, not as established fact or Escape Meridian's view.
Authors:Simeon Allmendinger, Edyta Paulina Bogucka, Niklas Kühl, Daniele Quercia
summary — pass: The summary faithfully conveys the abstract's argument: materiality means investor-relevance, so third-party harms appear only when they become company financial risks. It covers the 1,901-incident finding, the 67% vs 2% contrast, self-reporting under 2%, the conclusion, the proposal and the DISC release. The title change from Reveal to Show is harmless. Optional repairs: 'SEC' is never spelled out as Securities and Exchange Commission, and the point that filings carry liability for misstatement is omitted. Neither prevents understanding. The question is open, not leading.
Securities disclosure thus records the risks that AI actors face rather than the harms that people subject to AI bear.
date — pass: originalPublished is 2026-11-19. This matches the arXiv submission date and the v1 timestamp; the feed date of 2026-11-20 is correctly not used.
[Submitted on 19 Nov 2026]
support — pass: Each claim matches the abstract, and its excerpt is an exact substring. The limitations correctly note that the evidence is only the abstract and that the proposed accountability effect is unestablished. No unsupported benefits, costs or forecasts are added, and the proposal stays conditional.
Of the 1,901 incidents with filings before and after them, half belong to a risk type that the AI actor never disclosed
media — pass: The selected media is the verified direct arXiv abstract page for this paper, which is the most direct access to the source.
Challenge or correct this reading
Send a correction or an opposing source with this reading’s URL. Disagreement and uncertainty can remain unresolved.
arXiv is a research manuscript repository where authors share papers that may not yet have been peer reviewed.
Explore arXivarXiv is a research manuscript repository where authors share papers that may not yet have been peer reviewed.
Explore arXiv